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T
hrough the years, Philippine-Japan
trade relations have been limited in
two respects. One is the continuing
lag of Philippine exports to Japan vis-
à-vis the Philippine imports from Japan, result-
ing in huge trade deficits for the Philippines.
And two is the weaker Japan-Philippines trade
links as compared with Japan’s trade links with
other ASEAN countries and with China. In
2001, for instance, Japan’s imports from the
Philippines accounted only for 1.8 percent of
Japan’s total imports, a level much lower than
that for Indonesia at 4.3 percent, Malaysia at
3.7 percent, Thailand at 3.0 percent and China
at 16.6 percent.
Why is this so? What factors prevent the Phil-
ippines from getting a larger slice of the Japa-
nese market? Can the ongoing talks for a
Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership Agree-
ment (JPEPA) address these concerns?
This Policy Notes dwells on these issues as it
examines the opportunities and constraints for
Philippine consumer goods exports in the Japa-
nese market and looks at some areas for con-
sideration in the negotiations for a Japan-Phil-
ippines economic partnership agreement.
The Philippines’ position in Japan’s
markets
Before assessing how Philippine products fare
in the Japanese market, it is best to see first what
the country exports to Japan.
Of the total Philippine exports to Japan in 1998-
2002, about a third (33%) were generated by
semiconductors. This was followed by elec-
tronic data processing which made up for morePN 2005-02
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than a fifth (22%). As such, all electronic prod-
ucts combined accounted for 60 percent. Ma-
chineries and transport equipment parts com-
prised 8 percent, the bulk of which were auto-
motive parts (6%). Food and food preparations,
meanwhile, contributed only 8 percent, half
(4%) of which came from exports of fresh fruits
(bananas, pineapples, mangoes, papayas) and
vegetables (asparagus, okra, taro). Marine prod-
ucts, mainly shrimps and prawn, accounted for
3 percent. Nonfood consumer products, e.g.,
house products, footwear, fashion goods, deco-
rative goods, garments, etc., and resource-
based products, e.g., mineral, coconut, etc.,
each contributed 6 percent.
Based on employment data, industry leaders
have estimated the electronics value-added to
be roughly equivalent to 15 percent of export
earnings. This puts the net foreign exchange
contribution of electronics in 2002 to be about
US$500 million, a figure not so much higher
than the US$381 million contribution of food
products and US$268 million contribution of
nonfood consumer products.
How well do Philippine exports perform in
Japan’s markets? Looking at the shares of Phil-
ippine products in Japan’s imports and check-
ing if they are growing over time (World Bank
Market Position Matrix 1999), we can say that
the Philippines has an optimal market position
if our share in Japan’s dynamic import good is
increasing.1 A “lost market opportunity,” on the
other hand, is when the Philippines loses mar-
ket share in Japan’s dynamic imports.
Majority (almost three-fourths) of the products
for which the Philippines has optimal market
position in Japan are electronics, automotive,
and other industrial manufactures (circuits, re-
sistors, capacitors, switches, radio receivers,
input-output units, etc.). There are only a few
agricultural products (namely, fresh and dried
bananas, dried and salted fish), and consumer
manufactures (e.g., curtains and other furnish-
ings, babies’ garments and clothes, knitted gar-
ments, wood furniture, trousers, t-shirts and
vests) in the optimal list.
There is a preponderance, on the other hand,
of agricultural and food products as well as
consumer manufactures in which the Philip-
pines has lost market opportunity in Japan. Why
are the Philippine agricultural, food and con-
sumer product exports unable to successfully
compete in these growing import markets of
Japan? Are there opportunities to be tapped?
How about the constraints? What hurdles must
the country overcome in order to penetrate the
Japanese market?
The opportunities...
Agricultural and food products
The Philippines grows the principal fruit items
that Japan imports: bananas (58% of Japan’s
total fruit imports), pineapple (7%), mango (1%),
avocado (1%), and papaya (1%). Indeed, the
Philippines is Japan’s major source of tropical
______________
1 A product is considered dynamic if its share in total im-
ports of Japan is increasing.
Food and food preparations comprised 8 percent of the total Philippine
exports to Japan in 1998-2002, half (4%) of which came from exports of
fresh fruits (bananas, pineapples, mangoes, papayas) and vegetables
(asparagus, okra, taro).PN 2005-02
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fruits, supplying the market 79 percent of its
bananas, 98 percent of its pineapples, 61 per-
cent of its mangoes, and 48 percent of its pa-
payas (JETRO 2002b). Pineapple accounts for
12 percent of Japan’s import of fruit juices, of
which the Philippines is the dominant supplier
with a 36 percent market share (JETRO 2002b).
In the meantime, the Philippines’ current share
in Japan’s vegetable imports is only 1 percent,2
leaving much room for expansion. Its two ma-
jor fresh vegetable exports to Japan are okra
and asparagus. Okra fetches a price advantage
because demand comes from hotels and res-
taurants and is thus price inelastic. Also another
vegetable export to Japan is frozen taros but its
market is only 0.2 percent, a far second to
China’s 99.8 percent (JETRO 2002b). Philippine
pumpkin, in frozen form, is also a potentially
exportable vegetable to Japan.
As the Japanese become increasingly health
conscious, the traditional requirements for ap-
pearance and size of vegetables are replaced
by safety considerations (meaning, organic or
chemical-free vegetables). The present
miniscule share (2%) of the organic market in
Japan is expected to expand rapidly in the next
few years. JETRO consultants see a niche for
Philippine growers in the organic market, par-
ticularly, onions (28% of vegetable imports of
Japan) and carrots. According to Japanese ex-
perts, these two vegetables can be cultivated
cheaply and easily without the use of chemi-
cals in the Philippines.3
The upward trend in Japan’s fruit and vegetable
imports brought about by the vigorous market
liberalization efforts in the 1990s is expected
to continue for the following reasons: (1) the
persistent decline  in domestic production with
the shrinking farming population since aging
Japanese farmers are not replaced by younger
ones, (2) the sourcing of out-of-season supply
from countries with growing seasons different
from Japan (e.g., pumpkin), (3) diversification
of vegetable imports due to changing culinary
tastes, and (4) the growing use of reefer con-
tainers in marine transport which makes the
importation of large volumes of fresh vegetables
possible (JETRO 2002b).
In addition, the Philippines is nearer to the
source of Japan’s marine product imports such
as tuna and exotic seafood items as compared
to its Southeast Asian competitors. Japan is the
world’s largest market of raw tuna for sashimi.
Since Japan’s domestic catch of tuna is slug-
gish, the share of imported tuna in the Japa-
nese market is gradually increasing. In 2000,
58 percent of Japan’s tuna supply was imported.
Shrimps, lobsters and crabs are the other lead-
ing imported seafood products in Japan, with
farmed black tiger prawns accounting for an
overwhelming 96 percent share of the shrimp
and lobster market. For medium and large-size
shrimp, imports have a market volume share
of more than 98 percent while for crabs, it is
about 75 percent (JETRO 2002b).
Nonfood consumer products (apparel
and fashion goods, household goods,
furniture)
As an offshoot of Japan’s economic slowdown
in the 1990s, demand for luxury-class branded
products from Europe and the United States flat-
tened and lower-priced imports from China and
Southeast Asian countries are becoming in-
creasingly popular. Asian-made consumer
products fall under the mass market and me-
dium-quality categories in Japan’s market. Mass
market items usually involve consignment pro-
cessing and are manufactured with the abun-
______________
2 Notes from JETRO Workshop Series on Vegetable Pro-
duction/Marketing for Japan held in Makati in July 2003.
3 The Philippines used to export onions to Japan in the
1990s. Philippine onions satisfied the quality requirement
(juicy and soft) but failed to meet the size requirement
(Takusari, JETRO Manila  Workshop Secretariat May 2003).PN 2005-02
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dant materials available in China and South-
east Asia. Medium-quality items are imported
in small-sized lots with a large variety of de-
signs. They require shorter delivery times
(JETRO 2002b). Philippine exporters can focus
on the medium-quality items because the Phil-
ippine advantage lies in product design, crafts-
manship and the unique indigenous materials
found in the country.
Apart from favorable demand conditions in
Japan’s consumer goods markets, other market
premiums likewise exist.
One is a price premium. Relative to other for-
eign buyers, the Japanese market is less price-
conscious. They are willing to pay more for as
long as they get quality goods. Two is the assis-
tance extended by the Japanese buyers to en-
able exporters to meet the requirements of their
market. This includes the regular inspection of
plants, development of tools and equipment to
increase productivity, and provision of equip-
ment and machineries on credit. And three is
the loyalty of Japanese buyers. The Japanese
buyer will not seek nor accept offers from other
suppliers for as long as their present suppliers
satisfy all their requirements.
And the hurdles...
Protection and selectivity of the Japanese
market
Though the opportunities are many, there are
hurdles in tapping them.
For one, despite recent trade liberalization pro-
grams, Japan continues to use the food self-suf-
ficiency argument to justify the continuing pro-
tection and regulation of its agricultural and
food sectors. Tariff peaks still exist for agricul-
tural products. Even with the generalized sys-
tem of preference (GSP), Japan’s tariff rates on
agricultural products are still high: 10 percent
for fresh bananas, 17 percent for fresh pine-
apples, 5.5 percent for banana chips, and 15-
21.2 percent for nata de coco.4 Japan also con-
tinues to impose quantitative restrictions on fish-
eries products justified on the basis of sustain-
able resource use.
In addition to tariff and import quota barriers,
foreign firms’ access to the Japanese market
remains difficult and costly as the distribution
system stays complex, multilayered, nontrans-
parent and dominated by exclusive relations
among producers, wholesalers and retailers.
Hence, the successful Philippine exporters of
agricultural goods to Japan are limited to the
big farming conglomerates such as Dole Phil-
ippines and some Japanese-managed farms.
Penetrating Japan’s nonfood consumer goods
market, on the other hand, is capital-intensive.
It requires regular attendance in trade fairs and
exhibits and frequent visits to shops and mar-
kets inside and outside of Japan, a highly ex-
pensive marketing approach that is not afford-
able to small-scale Philippine consumer goods
exporters.
There are also nontariff barriers like the sani-
tary and phytosanitary (SPS) conditions and
quarantine regulations of the Japanese market,
said to be the most complex and stringent in
______________
4 These tariff rates were cited by the Japanese importer/
customer of a major Philippine food exporter to Japan.
These figures were doublechecked against those in the
various tariff tables in the JETRO Marketing Guidebook
for Imported Products.
...Foreign firms’ access to the Japanese market
remains difficult and costly as the distribution system
stays complex, multilayered, nontransparent and
dominated by exclusive relations among producers,
wholesalers and retailers. Hence, the successful
Philippine exporters of agricultural goods to Japan
are limited to the big farming conglomerates such as
Dole Philippines and some Japanese-managed farms.PN 2005-02
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the world and the biggest
impediment for agricultural
and foodstuff exporters to
Japan. Particularly cited by
exporters are: (1) Japan’s
metabisulfide5 standard of
50 ppm (parts per million),6
(2) required vapor heat
treatment (VHT) for fresh
fruits, and (3) numerous
qualitative standards for
food and other consumer
products that are mostly not
defined by the WTO SPS
agreement anymore as
health and safety risks.
Competition
Although the Philippines
has the dominant market
share for the fruit items that it exports to Japan,
it cannot and should not be complacent of the
competition posed by Ecuador and Taiwan for
bananas, Mexico for mangoes, and Hawaii for
papayas. In trying to increase its vegetable ex-
ports to Japan, meanwhile, it has to contend
with China which has already dominated sev-
eral of the Japanese vegetable markets and over-
taken many of the long-time major Japanese
suppliers such as the United States. For fresh
and frozen seafood exports such as shrimp,
prawns and tuna, our closest competitors are
Thailand, Indonesia and Vietnam.
In the case of nonfood consumer goods, the
main pressure again comes from China. Its
abundant supplies of raw materials, low wages
and competitive prices, helped further by con-
siderable technical assistance from Japan, have
made it the leading supplier (accounting for
more than half of imports) of the Japanese con-
sumer goods market in almost all product cat-
egories. Also fast becoming a major player to
trail China and overtake the Southeast Asian
countries is Vietnam. It is now next to China
and ahead of Thailand and Indonesia7 as source
of apparel exports to Japan.
The Philippine advantage in design and crafts-
manship in nonfood consumer products easily
fades out as some importers practise certain
disagreeable but nevertheless common busi-
ness strategies such as taking samples and pho-
tographs of Philippine-made products during
trade fairs and exhibits, and then having them
copied by factories in China. The Philippine
advantage in goods made from materials that
are available only here is likewise easily lost
with the exportation of the unprocessed raw
materials. This is the case for bangcuang and
______________
5 Metabisulfide is a chemical preservative to prevent the
growth of microorganisms and subsequent spoilage. It is
also an antibrowning agent.
6 This is too low compared to Europe’s 1000 ppm and US’
200 ppm.
7 The Philippines is not included in the list of top five ap-
parel exporters to Japan. Completing the list is India. This,
despite the fact that Thailand, Indonesia and the Philip-
pines were the Southeast Asian countries that first stepped
in to take the place of Korea and Taiwan in the late 1980s
as apparel exporters to Japan.PN 2005-02
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raftia, materials which we are now exporting
to China.
Philippine competitiveness
Because many of our consumer goods export-
ers are small and medium enterprises (SMEs),
there are numerous sources of cost disadvan-
tage.
One is the deficiency in technological know-
how. For example, simple heat insulation tech-
nology to conserve energy, surprisingly, is still
unknown or not applied in many of our SMEs.8
A major contributory factor to this problem is
the absence of linkages and cooperation among
the private sector and the academic and re-
search institutions. SMEs do not have the ca-
pacity to engage in their own “research and
development” programs. They have to rely on
outside pools of technical expertise and facili-
ties for information on efficiency-enhancing
technologies and for product and raw materi-
als development experimentations.
Two is the absence of economies of scale, par-
ticularly for major cost items in export produc-
tion such as packaging,9 storage and shipping/
transportation.
Three is the insufficiency of credit facilities for
collateral-constrained SMEs. Most exporters still
avail of the short-term Packing Credit Line for
both short-term and long-term capital needs.
The problem of short-term credit used to finance
long-term requirements for fixed capital acqui-
sition is well-known. When the supply of funds
dry up, loans are not rolled over and SMEs run
out of money to finance their daily operations.
Some exporters resort to informal financial
markets where cost of capital can be as high as
20 percent per month.10
Furthermore, certain government policies like
the minimum wage policy, indiscriminate trade
liberalization, inadequate infrastructure pro-
grams (communication and transportation), and
regulation of sugar imports (a major ingredient
in food exports) tend to raise the costs for ex-
porters. Apart from these competitiveness-im-
pairing policies, the Philippine government
does not provide sufficient leadership and sup-
port for industry and export organizations in
the field of food and consumer manufactures.
This is in sharp contrast with other Southeast
Asian countries where government leadership
and initiative in export promotion are clearly
evident in international trade fairs and exhib-
its,11 international business meetings and gath-
erings,12 and in the commercial and marketing
“intelligence” activities of the trade sections of
their overseas diplomatic missions.
Tuna canning (and marine product exports, in
general) provides us with a classic example of
Philippine exporters’ noncompetitiveness. De-
______________
8 During the focus group discussions (FGD) with directors
and members of the Philfoodex, one food processor men-
tioned how her firm’s monthly electricity bill had gone
down by about P25,000 after following an advice by a
JICA consultant to install a heat insulation system which
cost the firm only a one-time outlay of about P9,000.
9 Domestically sourced packaging materials are more ex-
pensive than imported ones. Importation, however, would
require volume.
10 Interview with a Philfoodex director.
11 Where Philippine booths are observed to be so inferior
to booths of other Asian countries.
12 Where our Asian competitors would come with a uni-
fied stand due to strong  industry/export organizations sup-
ported by government.
...The Philippine government does not provide
sufficient leadership and support for industry and
export organizations in the field of food and consumer
manufactures. This is in sharp contrast with other
Southeast Asian countries where government




spite the greater proximity of the Philippines,
compared to its Southeast Asian competitors,
to both supply (tuna) and demand (Japan), the
Philippines is losing the race to Thailand, In-
donesia and recently to Vietnam. Philippine
tuna canners admit they lag behind their Thai
counterparts13 in terms of technological know-
how. Philippine tuna canners suffer from cost
disadvantages in shipping, storage and pack-
aging because of their smaller size.14 The in-
dustry also does not get the government sup-
port enjoyed by its Thai, Indonesian and Viet-
namese15 counterparts.
Making the JPEPA Philippine
exporters-friendly
Can an economic partnership agreement be-
tween Japan and the Philippines bear fruit for
Philippine consumer good exporters? If yes,
then how?
Below are three major recommendations on
how the JPEPA can help Philippine exporters.
First is the inclusion of agricultural and pro-
cessed food sectors in the trade agreement.
Only with this can talks of further trade liberal-
ization between Japan and the Philippines bear
any significance for our consumer goods ex-
porters. It will be difficult to overestimate this
impact as Japan is the single biggest buyer of
Philippine shrimps and prawns (71%) and fresh
fruits and vegetables (60%). As major Philip-
pine agricultural exports are not cultivated in
Japan, there is no reason why the Japanese ag-
ricultural sector needs to be protected vis-à-vis
Philippine exporters.
Second is a commitment from Japan to under-
take import promotion programs particularly for
Philippine-made products. These would in-
clude (1) seminars and workshops on the Japa-
nese market, (2) buying missions to the Philip-
pines, (3) sales promotion missions in Japan,
(4) creation and accreditation of export testing
centers in the Philippines, and (5) establishment
of procedures and systems for claim verifica-
tion. The need for testing centers and claim veri-
fication systems must be addressed immediately
if both parties are  interested in facilitating the
flow of consumer goods from the Philippines.
JETRO’s information campaign activities on the
Japanese market in the Philippines for the past
couple of years have been impressive and we
can only hope for its continuation. In terms of
buying and sales promotion missions, however,
the Philippines still appears to be least priori-
tized in comparison with our Southeast Asian
competitors. More improvements in these ar-
eas are therefore desired.
Finally, Japan’s assistance in strengthening the
Philippine SME sector must be sought. Said
assistance must be focused toward the creation
of viable cooperatives, industry organizations
and institutional set-ups that will enable SMEs
to realize economies of scale in raw materials
sourcing, production, storage and transporta-
tion; to gain access to long-term sources of capi-
tal; and to seek technical assistance from aca-
demic and research laboratories.  
______________
13 Who can nicely fill up a tuna can with less raw material
(tuna) use.
14 Thailand’s biggest tuna canner is bigger than all tuna
canners in the Philippines combined.
15 For instance, Vietnamese firms, in partnership with their
government, have even developed a boatbuilding indus-
try in support of the growing fishing industry in Vietnam.
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PIDS has new president
The government think tank, the Philippine Institute for
Development Studies (PIDS), has named Josef T. Yap as
the new president of the Institute effective April 1, 2005.
He replaces Mario B. Lamberte whose term as president
ended on March 31.
Prior to his appointment, Dr. Yap was senior research fellow
at PIDS, specializing in econometric modeling and
macroeconomic policy. He prepares the annual outlook
on the Philippine economy for the Institute and maintains
the PIDS annual macro econometric model, among others.
He is also the research manager of the soon-to-be-
released first Southeast Asia Human Development Report.
Dr. Yap has a bachelor of science in industrial engineering
degree (cum laude) from the University of the Philippines-
Diliman. He also earned his master’s and doctorate
degrees in economics from the same university. He did
his post-graduate studies at the University of Pennsylvania
in the US.
In November of last year, President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo appointed Dr. Yap as acting member of the
Committee on Social and Human Sciences to the UNESCO
National Commission of the Philippines.
Oathtaking ceremonies for PIDS president. National Economic and
Development Authority (NEDA) Director-General and Socioeconomic
Planning Secretary Romulo L. Neri administers the oath of office to the
new president of the Philippine Institute for Development Studies (PIDS),
Dr. Josef T. Yap, in ceremonies held on April 19, 2005 at the NEDA sa
Makati Building in Makati City.
Witnessing the oathtaking are (from L-R) IRRI Deputy Director-General
William G. Padolina, Dr. Ledivina V. Cariño of the UP National College
of Public Administration and Governance, and Mrs. Ermi Yap. Dr.
Padolina and Dr. Cariño are members of the PIDS Board of Trustees.